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The Role of Ideology in Shaping Economists' Opinions on Inequality and Discrimination: Evidence from Uruguay

Verónica Amarante* - Marisa Bucheli** - Tatiana Pérez ***

Resumen

Este artículo investiga la relación entre el perfil ideológico de los economistas uruguayos y sus opiniones sobre la desigualdad y la discriminación. Utilizando datos de una encuesta en línea realizada a economistas uruguayos, exploramos los vínculos entre sus opiniones económicas y tres dimensiones de la ideología: orientación política, actitudes sexistas (sexismo benevolente y hostil) y visiones a favor del mercado. Las opiniones de los economistas abarcan evaluaciones diagnósticas de la desigualdad y la discriminación, así como puntos de vista sobre políticas específicas diseñadas para abordar estos problemas.

Utilizando modelos probit ordenados, encontramos que la ideología política de derecha, el sexismo hostil y las actitudes a favor del mercado están asociados con una menor probabilidad de estar de acuerdo con que la distribución del ingreso en Uruguay debería ser más equitativa y que las mujeres enfrentan barreras para el empleo a tiempo completo. Estos factores ideológicos también están relacionados con una mayor probabilidad de creer que existen oportunidades equitativas de género y raza en Uruguay. El sexismo benevolente exhibe una relación más mixta con las opiniones sobre la desigualdad y la discriminación. Además, mostramos que los diagnósticos de los economistas sobre la desigualdad y la discriminación median la relación entre las variables ideológicas y sus preferencias de políticas. Nuestros resultados apuntan a la necesidad de una mayor introspección dentro de la disciplina con respecto a la influencia de los valores y creencias personales en el análisis económico y las recomendaciones de políticas. Nuestros hallazgos desafían la noción de la economía como una disciplina puramente objetiva e imparcial, revelando asociaciones significativas entre factores ideológicos, las percepciones de los economistas sobre la desigualdad y la discriminación, y su apoyo a políticas específicas.

Palabras clave: ideología, sexismo, desigualdad, discriminación

Códigos JEL: A13; D63; J16

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Abstract

This paper investigates the link between the ideological profile of Uruguayan economists and their opinions regarding inequality and discrimination. Drawing on data from an online survey of Uruguayan economists, we explore the links between their economic opinions and three dimensions of ideology: political orientation, sexist attitudes (benevolent and hostile sexism), and pro-market views. Economists' opinions encompass diagnostic assessments of inequality and discrimination, as well as views on specific policies designed to address these issues.

Using ordered probit models, we find that right-wing political ideology, hostile sexism, and pro-market attitudes are associated with a lower likelihood of agreeing that income distribution in Uruguay should be more equitable and that women face barriers to full-time employment. These ideological factors are also linked to a higher likelihood of believing that there are equal gender and race opportunities in Uruguay. Benevolent sexism exhibits a more mixed relationship with opinions on inequality and discrimination. Furthermore, we show that economists' diagnoses of inequality and discrimination mediate the relationship between ideological variables and their policy preferences. Our results point to the need for greater introspection within the discipline regarding the influence of personal values and beliefs on economic analysis and policy recommendations. Our findings challenge the notion of economics as a purely objective and unbiased discipline, revealing significant associations between ideological factors, economists' perceptions of inequality and discrimination, and their support for specific policies.

Keywords: ideology, sexism, inequality, discrimination

JEL Classification: A13; D63; J16

1. Introducción

Economists play a significant role in shaping public policies and influencing public opinion. Their position of power among social scientists has been noted in several studies (Fourcade et al. 2015; Hirschman and Berman 2014). Despite this influence, economists have no complete consensus on a broad range of issues. Empirical literature has attempted to identify the determinants of this disagreement, with studies based on surveys, petitions, and experiments pointing to several potential sources, including gender (May et al. 2014; 2018), political ideology (Beyer and Puehringer 2021; De Benedictis and Di Maio 2011; Haab and Whitehead 2017; Klein and Stern 2007), personal values (van Dalen 2019; Javdani and Chang 2023), and school of economic thought (De Benedictis and Di Maio 2016).

The present study investigates the role of ideology in explaining the heterogeneity of Uruguayan economists' opinions about inequality and discrimination. Cross-country comparisons, despite the challenges posed by differences in questionnaires and samples, suggest that economists in Latin America are more likely than their counterparts in developed countries to support the notion that income inequality should decrease. Geide-Stevenson and La Parra-Pérez (2021) find that 14% of American economists disagree on the desirability of a more equal income distribution, while Andere and Canché (2019) report a disagreement rate of only 4% among Mexican economists. In Uruguay, 9% of economists disagree with a similar proposition. Less research has been conducted on economists' opinions about equal opportunities and gender and racial discrimination. However, studies in the USA and Europe have detected differences between male and female economists regarding opinions on gender equality and equal opportunities, with women economists more likely to agree that opportunities are unequal (May et al. 2018). Among Uruguayan economists, only 10% agree that there are gender-equal opportunities, and 9% believe there are equal opportunities between Afro-Uruguayans and the rest of the population.

Our study makes two key contributions. First, we illustrate Uruguayan economists' opinions on inequality and discrimination, considering the level of consensus. Second, we explore the links between these opinions and individuals' ideological profiles, encompassing normative values and political preferences. We measure ideology along three dimensions: political ideology on a left-right scale, sexist attitudes (both hostile and benevolent), and pro-market vs. pro-government intervention views. This rich ideological data allows us to investigate not only economists' positions on the diagnosis of inequality and discrimination but also their views on policies proposed to address these issues.

Using ordered probit models, we find that right-wing political ideology, hostile sexism, and pro-market attitudes are associated with a lower likelihood of agreeing that in Uruguay, income distribution should be more equitable and that women face barriers to full-time employment. Besides, these ideological dimensions increase the likelihood of believing that there are equal gender and race opportunities. Furthermore, we show that economists' diagnoses of inequality and discrimination mediate the relationship between ideological variables and their policy preferences. Our results point to the need for greater introspection within the discipline regarding the influence of personal values and beliefs on economic analysis and policy recommendations.

The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses how political ideology, sexism, and pro-market attitudes may influence economists' views; Section 3 presents the data and empirical strategy; Section 4 describes economists' ideological profiles; Section 5

examines the level of consensus and dissensus in the opinions on inequality and discrimination; Section 6 analyzes the role of ideology in shaping these opinions; and Section 7 concludes.

2. The role of ideology in shaping economists' opinions

The influence of normative values and political preferences on social sciences, particularly economics, has been a subject of long-standing debate. Extreme positions view social sciences either from a "rationalist" approach, assuming that policymaking can be based on objective evidence, or from an "interpretivist" or "constructivist" philosophy, which holds that evidence is a matter of subjective interpretation (Newman 2016). While mainstream economics emphasizes the discipline's positivist nature, characterizing economists as dispassionate, objective, unbiased, and non-ideological (Friedman 1953), critical studies have explored the profession's biases, structures, and practices (Colander and Klammer 1987; Colander 2005; Saint Paul 2018).

Several studies have investigated the role of political orientation in shaping economists' opinions on economic policies, with most finding a significant association between the two. Beyer and Puehringer (2021) analyze the petition-signing economists' political preferences and social networks in the USA, revealing a strong partisan divide that mirrors the liberal-conservative cleavage in the US political system. They conclude that economic experts often follow their personal political preferences when entering the political arena despite their high symbolic capital. Similarly, the opinions of Italian economists on economic issues and policies are significantly related to their ideological identity (De Benedictis and Di Maio 2011; 2016). Among US environmental economists, Haab and Whitehead (2017) find that politically liberal respondents are more likely to identify market failures in public goods, believe that population degrades the environment, support energy taxes, and are less likely to support free market environmentalism or the elimination of mandatory recycling laws.

Other authors have focused on the role of personal values, rather than ideology, in shaping economists' positive and normative claims about the economy. Van Dalen (2019) argues that values matter when making economic statements and permeate economists' attitudes toward methodological principles and scientific norms, suggesting that value neutrality is an unlikely state of affairs in economics. Van Gunten et al. (2016) use principal component analysis to infer influential US economists' positions in a latent "idea space" and identify a consistent ideological dimension in their beliefs that influences pressing public policy issues. This finding contradicts Gordon and Dahl's (2013) earlier report of strong professional consensus and an absence of discernible ideology based on the same data. Javdani and Chang (2023) employ a different methodological approach, using an online randomized controlled experiment involving 2,425 economists in 19 countries. By randomly assigning mainstream, non-mainstream, or no-source attributions to identical statements, they find that changing attributions from mainstream to less-/non-mainstream sources significantly reduces agreement levels, indicating the presence of both ideological and authority bias among economists.

Finally, a strand of the literature focuses on gender attitudes and stereotypes. Most evidence analyzes their role in shaping opinions about gender quotas and fair play policies. Pereira and Porto (2020) consider different conceptual dimensions of gender attitudes, drawing on Glick

and Fiske's (1996) ambivalent sexism theory, which distinguishes between hostile sexism and benevolent sexism. Hostile sexism reflects expressing antipathy toward women viewed as seeking to control men, whereas benevolent sexism refers to offering protection and admiration to women viewed as generous and supportive. They find that hostile sexism negatively affects support for gender quotas and gender equality among Brazilians, while benevolent sexism strongly positively affects support for gender quotas but negatively affects support for gender equality. Cassese et al. (2015) and Barnes and Cassese (2016) define modern sexism as an unwillingness to attribute gender inequality to discrimination and a strong endorsement of traditional gender roles, finding that it affects opinions on issues such as fair pay policy, abortion, and childcare. These recent articles highlight the need to explore further the links between different conceptual dimensions of gender attitudes and opinions on various policies, particularly those related to discrimination.

3. Methodological aspects

3.1. Data

Our database was compiled from an online survey (from here on, EEGU) conducted in 2021 of individuals who graduated with a degree in Economics from Uruguayan universities between 1980 and 2021. During this period, the country's Economics degree underwent some changes. Until 1995, education in Economics was exclusively conducted by one public university. However, when private universities introduced Economics programs, they began to produce a significant proportion of the country's economists (Amarante et al. 2021).

We contacted all graduates by email and invited them to complete a questionnaire.¹ The email explained that we were conducting a research study to gather insights into economists' opinions on various economic and policy issues. It also emphasized that all responses would be anonymized by separating them from the respondent's identity once the questionnaire was completed. The survey was open for responses from February 1 to April 30, 2021. We promoted the survey during those months using social media platforms and follow-up emails.

The total population of Economics graduates from 1980 to 2021 is 3,307. Due to deaths or unavailability for contact, we emailed 3,199 economists. In total, 900 individuals completed the questionnaire, resulting in a response rate of 28 percent. This level is similar to response rates in comparable international surveys, such as 31% in the USA (Fuller and Geider-Stevenson 2003), 33% in Italy (De Benedictis and Di Maio 2011), and 21% in Mexico (Andere and Canche 2019).

3.2. The questionnaire

Our questionnaire collects information about several economists' characteristics and inquires about opinions on various topics by requesting agreement with certain statements. To select the opinions, we considered allowing comparisons with other countries and collecting views about issues of interest in Uruguay. Some of these topics, related to consensus among Uruguayan economists or support for market solutions and government interventions, were

¹ We got access to the roster of graduates from the public university. Some graduates in that list (mainly from the oldest cohorts) did not have an available/actual email address. We searched them through all the available channels (social media, telephone number, among others) to complete the database. For graduates from private universities, we collaborated with their respective Departments of Economics, who directly contacted their alumni on our behalf.

analyzed in previous work (Amarante, Bucheli and Lara 2023; Amarante, Bucheli and Pérez 2024). This paper focuses on 11 statements about economic inequality and discrimination, as discussed below.

3.2.1. Opinions on Inequality and Discrimination

The questionnaire included six statements about inequality and seven about discrimination, as presented in Table 1.² One statement about inequality provides a diagnostic assessment (proposition 1: "Income distribution should be more equitable"), while the other five focus on policy-related actions. The discrimination set includes two diagnostic statements related to equality of opportunities by gender and race (propositions 7 and 8 in Table 1) and a mixed statement that combines a diagnostic assessment of the barriers women face in accessing full-time jobs with the identification of the domestic work and childcare burden as a causal factor (proposition 9). The remaining four statements in the discrimination set are policy-oriented (propositions 10 to 13). Our analysis will consider the mixed statement (proposition 9) as a diagnostic statement.

² The selection of statements is based on prior research in the field (Fuller and Geide-Stevenson 2003; Fuller and Geide-Stevenson 2007; Fuller and Geide-Stevenson 2014; Geide-Stevenson and La Parra-Pérez 2021; Andere and Canche 2019; Lora and Ñopo 2009; Colander and Ñopo 2011; Correa 2016; Van Dalen 2019; May et al. 2014; May et al 2018; Mayer 2001; Urzua 2007; Kamas and Preston 2019). The only questions not previously considered in questionnaires applied to economists are the ones related to race discrimination (9 and 12 in Table 1).

Table 1. Opinions about inequality and discrimination

Variable name	Phrasing of opinion
<i>Inequality</i>	
1. More equal distribution*	Income distribution should be more equitable
2. Validity of state redistributive action	Income redistribution is one of the activities that the government must carry out
3. Direct taxes as the core of taxes	Direct taxes should serve as the primary foundation of national tax systems
4. In favor of inheritance taxes	I am in favor of inheritance taxes based on philosophical reasons
5. Spending preferable to taxes	Public spending, rather than taxes, is the most effective tool for redistribution
6. Non-increase of taxes on top incomes	Taxes on the richest should not grow because they are already paying very high rates
<i>Discrimination</i>	
7. Equal gender opportunities*	Men and women have the same employment opportunities
8. Equal race opportunities*	Afro-descendants have the same job opportunities as the rest of the population
9. Female barriers to full-time jobs *	For women, having a good full-time job is difficult due to the disproportionate burden of domestic and care work
10. Promotion of gender equity in political decision-making	The government should promote gender equity in political decision-making spaces
11. In favor of affirmative policies for gender balance	(Support to) Implement affirmative action programs to increase the gender balance in senior positions in private companies
12. In favor of childcare services development	(Support to) Implement policies to ensure the availability and accessibility of childcare services
13. In favor of affirmative policies for race balance	(Support to) Implement affirmative action programs to increase the presence of afro-descendants in the private sector

Note: *Diagnostic statements

Respondents were asked to express their level of agreement with each statement using a five-point Likert-type scale, with higher values indicating greater agreement. Respondents also had the option to select "I don't know" for each statement.

To assess the internal consistency of the statements, we calculated Cronbach's alpha, a widely used measure of reliability. Although there is no universally agreed-upon cutoff value for this indicator, a commonly accepted practice is considering values greater than 0.7 as evidence of adequate correlation among the items. In our analysis, we obtained a Cronbach's alpha of 0.75 for the statements related to inequality and 0.86 for those about discrimination, suggesting a high level of internal consistency within each set of statements.

3.2.2 Personal characteristics and ideological profile

The survey collected demographic and personal information about the respondents, including gender, age, current or past work in the academic sector, country of residence, postgraduate education (distinguishing between Ph.D. and Master's degrees), paternal educational level (identifying individuals whose father completed tertiary education), political ideology, and a set of questions regarding gender attitudes. Based on this information, we constructed a set of variables; we report their main descriptive statistics in Table A1 in the Annex.

We used four variables to capture different dimensions of ideology: political ideology, hostile sexism, benevolent sexism, and pro-market attitudes.

The questionnaire asked about political ideology: respondents had to choose a position on a scale from 1 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right). We use this variable as reported.

The survey gathered information on sexist attitudes using the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (ASI) proposed by Glick and Fiske (1996; 1997). The ASI measures orientations toward women representing Hostile Sexism (HS) and Benevolent Sexism (BS). HS refers to derogatory views of women, and two statements in the EEGU aimed to capture this: "Many women are actually seeking special favors, such as hiring policies that favor them over men, under the guise of asking for equality" and "When women lose to men in a fair competition, they typically complain about being discriminated against." We used the Spanish translation Vaamande and Omar (2012) validated for Argentinian subjects. The Spearman's rank correlation coefficient between these statements was 0.516, and the independence test indicated that we could reject the variables' independence at $p=0.000$. We constructed an HS index as the average value of the answers, with higher values indicating more hostile sexist attitudes.

BS refers to attitudes that justify traditional gender roles using subjectively positive but patronizing stereotypes. The survey included the Spanish version of two sentences validated by Vaamande and Omar (2012) to measure BS: "Women are more sensitive and compassionate than men" and "Men should be willing to sacrifice their own well-being in order to provide financially for the women in their lives." Additionally, the survey included another sentence proposed by Latinobarometro that aligns with BS: "In politics, men are more corrupt than women." The correlations between these sentences were lower than those observed for hostile sexism attitudes, with two-by-two Spearman's coefficients ranging from 0.08 to 0.23. However, we could reject independence at the usual p -values. We constructed a BS index as the average of the non-missing answers to the three sentences, with higher values indicating higher levels of benevolent sexism.

Finally, we created a pro-market attitudes index using the level of agreement with twelve statements about economics and policy issues involving support for the free market instead of government regulations. We report the twelve sentences in Table A2 in the Annex. The survey asked for agreement using a five-point Likert-type scale and allowed respondents to skip questions. The index is the average of the twelve answers after reversing the order when necessary to ensure that it increased with support for the free market (rather than government intervention).

3.3. Methodology

We begin by describing the level of heterogeneity in opinions, that is, the extent of consensus or dissensus regarding Uruguayan economists' views on these topics. For this purpose, we follow the proposal of Fuller and Geide-Stevenson (2003; 2014) and calculate three measures to provide an overall assessment of the level of consensus for each statement. The three indicators are the Chi-square test of goodness-of-fit to a uniform distribution, the proportion of agreement or disagreement, and the relative entropy index.³

The Chi-square goodness-of-fit test examines the fit of the data to a uniform distribution. The maximum dissent in a statement means that the frequency of all answers is the same. We consider that there is some level of consensus when we reject the test's null hypothesis at a 10% significance level. We perform this test after synthesizing the distribution of the opinion into three positions: disagreement (responses 1 and 2), neutral position (response 3), and

³ A previous study provides an in depth discussion of these measures of consensus, alongside with a measure of dispersion proposed by Tastlte and Wierman (2007), for all the statements considered in our questionnaire to Uruguayan economists (see Amarante, Bucheli and Lara 2023).

agreement (responses 4 and 5). As Geide Stevenson and La Parra-Pérez (2020) discussed, this test is a weak measure of consensus that tends to reject the null hypothesis of a uniform distribution.

The second indicator considers the proportion of disagreement (responses 1 and 2 on our Likert scale) or agreement (responses 4 or 5) for each proposition. There is consensus in an opinion when either of these proportions exceeds 67%.

The third indicator is the relative entropy index ε :

$$\varepsilon = \frac{E(p_i)}{\max E(p_i)} = \sum_{i=1}^n -p_i \log_2(p_i) / \max E(p_i) \quad (1)$$

The relative entropy index ε is the ratio between the entropy index $E(p_i)$ and the maximum possible entropy. For the calculation of the entropy index $E(p_i)$, n is the maximum number of responses (five) and p_i is the relative frequency of response i . The maximum possible entropy occurs when responses are equally distributed across all possible response options ($p_i = 0.2$ in our case). Consensus is stipulated when the relative entropy index is less than 0.8.

Based on these three indicators, the degree of consensus is classified as strong when all three indicate consensus. If two indicators suggest consensus, we refer to it as substantial consensus; if only one indicator does, we consider it modest consensus. Total dissent (or no consensus) means that none of the indicators signify consensus.

The second and main step in our methodological approach is the econometric analysis of the role of ideology in shaping opinions about inequality and discrimination. We first explore the associations for our four diagnosis statements, D_i (the need for a more equal distribution, the existence of equal gender or race opportunities, the existence of female barriers to full time jobs).⁴ As discussed earlier, our broad concept of ideology encompasses the dimensions of political orientation, attitudes toward benevolent sexism, hostile sexism, and pro-market adherence. We estimate an Ordered Probit equation for each of the 4 diagnosis statements:

$$D_i = \alpha_0 + \sum_i \beta_i I_i + \sum_i \delta_i Z_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (2)$$

The variable D denotes the statement agreement response and the subscript i indicates the individual economist. The vector I comprises the ideological variables of interest: political ideology, hostile and benevolent sexism, and pro-market attitudes. The vector Z includes socio-demographic and economic variables: gender, age, father's education, occupation in the academic sector, postgraduate education, and country of residence.

To address the links between the economists' ideological profile and their opinions about specific policies, we follow a two steps approach. We first run a similar specification to equation (2) for the nine statements related to policies, Y_i , as shown in equation (3), and then we add to that specification the relevant diagnostic statement as an explanatory variable⁵.

⁴ Our diagnostic statements are different in nature: the one addressing income inequality is a normative proposition, whereas the other three, referring to equal gender and race opportunities, are descriptive.

⁵ The estimates were also conducted by individually incorporating each ideology question into the model, yielding no significant changes in the results. These additional results are available upon request.

$$Y_i = \alpha_0 + \sum_i \beta_i I_i + \sum_i \delta_i Z_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (2)$$

$$Y_i = \alpha_0 + \sum_i \beta_i I_i + \sum_i \gamma_i D_i + \sum_i \delta_i Z_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (3)$$


Thus, for statements related to inequality policies (statements 2 to 6 in Table 1), we add the economist's opinion about the equitable condition of current income distribution as an explanatory variable. In the case of statements related to anti-discrimination policies (statements 10 to 13), we add the three statements related to the diagnosis of discrimination (statements 7 to 9) as explanatory variables. By doing this, we attempt to elucidate the influence of economists' diagnoses on their policy orientations and determine whether the association between ideological variables and policy opinions is mediated by economists' assessments of the economy's functioning.

One of the main limitations of our study is the assumption that ideology, sexism, and pro-market attitudes are exogenous variables. In other words, we treat these factors as independent variables that influence the outcome of interest without considering the possibility that they may be endogenous. In the context of our study, it is possible that ideology, sexism, and pro-market attitudes are not purely exogenous; rather, they may result from socialization or self-selection into the field of economics. For example, individuals already predisposed to certain ideological beliefs or attitudes may be more likely to choose to study economics in the first place. Alternatively, exposure to economic theories and ideas during education may shape an individual's ideology and gender attitudes over time (Paredes et al. 2020).

4. Political ideology, market orientation, and sexist attitudes of Uruguayan economists

Figure 1 presents the frequency of the four variables included in our ideology concept. Graph A shows the political position of the economists surveyed. The results indicate that they are more likely to self-classify on the left side of the political spectrum than the right: the average value of the variable is 4.1, the mode is 3, and 45% of the cases concentrate on values 1 to 3 (on a scale from 1 to 10). Only 14% chose values above 6. We compare this information with data from Latinobarometro (2020), which provides information about the general population's political ideology on a scale from 0 to 10. According to Latinobarometro, university graduates living in Uruguay self-identify as having lower values (tending towards the left side of the spectrum) than the non-graduate population. When comparing these results with our database, we find that the tendency towards the left-wing side is more pronounced among the economists surveyed by EEGU than among the graduates participating in the Latinobarometro survey. Assuming that both surveys provide accurate estimates, this suggests that economists in Uruguay are more likely to be left-wing than other professionals. However, without further information, it is difficult to determine whether these figures reflect the actual heterogeneity of graduates' ideologies across professions or whether the EEGU survey has a self-selection bias.

Figure 1. Frequency of ideological variables



Graph B of Figure 1 shows the histogram of the pro-market inclination index. The overall shape of the graph indicates that most economists lean towards a pro-government

intervention stance, with 62% of the cases lying below the average neutral position (3). Few economists are at the distribution extremes. For 6% of the cases, the index is below 2, depicting economists with strong pro-government intervention preferences. On the other tail of the distribution, only 2% of economists have a strong adherence to the functioning of free markets, as reflected by values above 4 in our index.

Graphs C and D of Figure 1 present the frequencies of the hostile and benevolent sexism indices, respectively. Economists mostly disagree with statements aimed at capturing hostile sexism (HS): the index mode is 2, and only 14% of the cases have values above 3 (the neutral position). A value of 1, denoting non-hostile sexism, accounts for 19% of the respondents. In contrast, benevolent sexism (BS) is more prevalent than hostile sexism among the surveyed economists. The mode of the BS index is 3; 26% of the cases take values above 3, and only 2% take the value of 1 (non-benevolent sexism).

The ambivalent sexism theory proposes that hostile and benevolent sexism may be dichotomous or complementary (Glick and Fiske, 1996). To explore the relationship between these two forms of sexism, we calculate Spearman's rank correlation coefficient for the indices, which yields a value of 0.098. We can reject the independence of the two indices at a significance level of 1%. This outcome suggests that hostile and benevolent sexism are complementary forces for our sample of economists.

We performed calculations to analyze the relationships among the four variables. First, we computed the matrix of Spearman's correlation coefficients (see Table A3 in the Annex). The results suggest a positive relationship between being right-wing, supporting the free market, and reporting hostile sexist attitudes. However, benevolent sexism does not correlate with political ideology or pro-market attitudes.


Second, we analyzed groups of ideology. As BS does not appear to be associated with the other dimensions, we created groups based on political orientation, HS, and market support, classifying each variable into three categories. Left-wing individuals are those who chose values 1 to 3 on the political position scale, center-wing are those who selected 4 to 6, and right-wing those who chose values from 7 to 10. To build three groups according to HS and pro-market attitudes, we considered the center position values between 2.5 and 3.5. Combining all possibilities yielded 27 potential groups.

Figure 2 shows the frequency of the groups, each identified by a three-digit code. The first digit denotes political orientation, where "Pl" is left-wing, "Pc" is center-wing, and "Pr" is right-wing. The second digit reflects the categorical value of pro-market attitudes, with "Ml" representing low support, "Mm" medium support, and "Mh" high support for free markets. Lastly, the third digit designates the group based on the HS index, where "Hl" indicates low hostile sexism, "Hm" indicates a medium level, and "Hh" indicates a high level of hostile sexism.

Approximately 25% of economists are left-wing, government intervention supporters and report low levels of hostile sexism. Another 15% of left-wing economists belong to the low-level HS group but report moderate support for pro-market attitudes. Among the center-wing, the most frequent cases also belong to the low-level HS group. However, in contrast to the left-wing, moderate support for pro-market attitudes is more prevalent than low support, representing 21% of the sample. Additionally, the incidence of high levels of pro-market attitudes and high levels of HS is higher among the center-wing. Finally, right-wing

individuals tend to express moderate or high support for the free market and exhibit the highest frequency of high hostile sexism levels.

Figure 2. Frequency of ideological groups based on three dimensions: political orientation, pro-market attitudes, and hostile sexism level.



Source: Author's estimates based on EEGU

In sum, the findings support the hypothesis that we may define ideology as the views on three dimensions. At one extreme, there is a group that self-identifies as left-wing in the political spectrum, rejects views reflecting hostile sexism, and supports government interventions in the markets. On the other extreme, a group self-identifies as right-wing, expresses hostile sexist views and defends the free markets. This first insight into a comprehensive concept of ideology suggests that, despite the positive correlation between HS and BS, ideologically different individuals share similar benevolent sexism views. In contrast, individuals may share the ideology defined by those three dimensions and differ in their benevolent sexism views.

5. Consensus and dissent about inequality and discrimination among Uruguayan economists

Table 2 presents information about the opinions on inequality, including the percentage of economists who declare having no opinion about each statement, the average response (on a Likert scale from 1 to 5), and two consensus indicators: the percentage of agreement (responses 4 and 5) or disagreement (responses 1 and 2) for each statement, and the entropy index. The final column presents the overall evaluation of the degree of consensus for each statement assessed, as presented in Section 3.3.

In this block of six questions, two statements elicit strong consensus: the agreement that income distribution should be more equitable and that income redistribution is one of the tasks to be carried out by the government (Table 2). Studies for Mexico also find high consensus on these questions (Urzúa 2007; Andere and Canche 2019), which is not observed with the same strength in the United States (Fuller and Geide-Stevenson 2014).

The remaining statements refer to fiscal tools for redistribution, with an implicit assessment of the role of direct taxes and spending. The highest percentages of agreement correspond to not increasing taxes on the richest because they already pay very high rates (65%), and to support that direct taxes should be the pillar of tax systems (58%). There is less agreement with the opinion on supporting inheritance taxes for philosophical reasons (49%). Finally, most responses concentrate on the neutral position regarding the importance of spending versus taxation for redistribution.

Thus, although there is agreement on the need for greater income equity and the importance of the state's role in achieving it, there is no consensus on the best redistributive tools. This motivates our attempts to understand further the potential associations between dissensus on these opinions and ideological factors.

Table 2. Proportion of no opinion, average value and consensus measures for statements about "Inequality"

Statement	% without opinion (WO), Average opinion ^{a/}	% Agreement/Disagreement, and Entropy index ^{b/}	Level of consensus ^{c/}
1. More equal distribution*	WO: 8.02 Average: 4.03	Agreement: 78.57 Entropy: 0.78	Strong
2. Validity of state redistributive action	WO: 3.34 Average: 4.12	Agreement: 83.06 Entropy: 0.75	Strong
3. Direct taxes as the core of taxes	WO: 9.35 Average: 3.51	Agreement: 57.99 Entropy: 0.85	Modest
4. In favor of inheritance taxes	WO: 7.91 Average: 3.17	Agreement: 49.09 Entropy: 0.97	Modest
5. Spending preferable to taxes	WO: 6.90 Average: 2.94	Disagreement: 34.21 Entropy: 0.82	Modest
6. Non-increase of taxes on top incomes	WO:8.69 Average: 2.22	Disagreement: 65.12 Entropy: 0.89	Modest

Notes: For each opinion, calculations do not consider cases where the response is "No opinion" and cases where no response is recorded.
a/ WO: % do not answer or do not know.
b/ %Agreement/Disagreement: percentage of responses 1 and 2 (Disagreement) or 4 and 5 (Agreement). A chi-square goodness-of-fit test was also calculated with the null hypothesis that the responses are uniformly distributed. For all propositions, H₀ is rejected with p < 0.01.
c/Consensus summary: If all 3 measures (%Agreement/Disagreement, Entropy, and Chi-square) indicate consensus, the consensus is strong; if 2, substantial; if 1, modest; if none, null.

Source: Author's estimates based on EEGU

The block related to discrimination includes seven statements; Table 3 presents the main results regarding these statements. There is strong consensus in rejecting the notion that opportunities are equal for women and Afro-descendants compared to the rest of the population (more than 80% of those surveyed). Furthermore, there is strong consensus in understanding that the government should promote gender equity in political decision-making (79%) and substantial consensus in considering that domestic work makes it difficult for women to enter the labor market (76%).

Although the proportion of acceptance for implementing affirmative action policies is above 70%, the indicators suggest a lower level of consensus. Moreover, the proportion of non-response for these policies rises to just over 10%. In contrast, the third policy - implementing measures that guarantee the availability of and access to childcare services - garners strong consensus despite having a non-response rate of almost 10%. The agreement is higher for this proposition than for diagnosing the limitations imposed on women by domestic and care work. This finding suggests that support for childcare services may be motivated by factors linked to

childcare itself rather than solely by the potential positive effects on women's labor market participation.

Table 3. Proportion of no opinion, average value, and consensus measures for statements about "Discrimination"

Statement	% without opinion (WO), Average opinion ^{a/}	% Agreement/Disagreement, and Entropy index ^{b/}	Level of consensus ^{c/}
7. Equal gender opportunities*	WO: 7.68 Average: 1.93	Disagreement: 84.92 Entropy: 0.70	Strong
8. Equal race opportunities*	WO: 9.47 Average: 1.83	Disagreement: 85.12 Entropy: 0.72	Strong
9. Female barriers to full-time jobs*	WO: 7.91 Average: 3.93	Agreement: 76.54 Entropy: 0.81	Substantial
10. Promotion of gender equity in political decision-making	WO: 7.80 Average: 4.07	Agreement: 78.74 Entropy: 0.79	Strong
11. In favor of affirmative policies for gender balance	WO:10.58 Average: 3.93	Agreement: 71.98 Entropy: 0.85	Substantial
12. In favor of childcare services development	WO:9.91 Average: 4.75	Agreement: 96.29 Entropy: 0.39	Strong
13. In favor of affirmative policies for race balance	WO:11.14 Average: 3.99	Agreement: 74.56 Entropy: 0.83	Substantial

Notes: For each opinion, calculations do not consider cases where the response is "No opinion" and cases where no response is recorded.

a/ WO: % do not answer or do not know.

b/ %Agreement/Disagreement: percentage of responses 1 and 2 (Disagreement) or 4 and 5 (Agreement). A chi-square goodness-of-fit test was also calculated with the null hypothesis that the responses are uniformly distributed. For all propositions H_0 is rejected with $p < 0.01$.

c/Consensus summary: If all 3 measures (%Agreement/Disagreement, Entropy and Chi-square) indicate consensus, consensus is strong; if 2, substantial; if 1, modest; if none, null.

Source: Author's estimates based on EEGU

6. Economists' ideological profile and their opinions about inequality and discrimination

We begin by analyzing the relationships between the four diagnostic statements—one concerning inequality and three concerning discrimination—and ideological profiles. Table 4 presents the results from the estimation of equation (2). These estimations confirm the importance of political ideology, hostile sexism, and pro-market attitudes in shaping opinions about the state of inequality and the presence of discrimination, as discussed in the previous section.

The political ideology variable exhibits negative values for two of the statements (columns 1 and 4), indicating that being further to the left wing increases the probability of considering that income inequality should be more equitable and that women face barriers to full-time employment. For the other two statements, the positive sign suggests that being further to the right-wing increases the likelihood of perceiving equal gender and race opportunities.

The results regarding benevolent sexism are mixed. It is not associated with economists' evaluations of income inequality. However, as BS increases, disagreement with the diagnosis of equal gender and race opportunities also does. Although the association is weak, higher levels of BS are associated with support for the idea that women face barriers to full-time employment.

The indicator of hostile sexism depicts more precise patterns than BS, and reflects similarities with the political ideological profile. Economists who exhibit higher levels of HS tend to agree with the diagnosis of equal gender and race opportunities, underlining the fundamentally different nature of the ideologies embedded in BS and HS. The higher the HS index, the less likely economists agree that income distribution should be more equitable or that women face barriers to full-time employment.

The indicator of pro-market attitudes is also significantly related to these diagnostic statements, displaying a similar pattern to political ideology. More pro-market economists are more likely to agree with the idea of equal gender and race opportunities and less likely to support the need for a more equitable distribution or the existence of barriers for women to obtain full-time jobs.

Regarding other control variables, we find significant gender differences. Women exhibit higher levels of disagreement than men with the statement about the existence of equal opportunities for men and women, and they express greater agreement with the idea that women face barriers to obtaining full-time employment. However, women are more likely to agree that equal opportunities exist for different races and are less supportive than men of the view that a more egalitarian income distribution is necessary.

Age also plays a role in shaping economists' opinions. Older economists are more inclined to believe that men and women have equal opportunities and are more likely to disagree with the notion that women face barriers to full-time employment.

Furthermore, economists' educational background and location influence their perceptions. Those who reside abroad and hold a doctorate are more likely to believe that women encounter obstacles to full-time work. Similarly, economists with a master's degree also endorse this

sentence, although showing greater support for the need for a more equitable income distribution.

Table 4. Estimated coefficients of the ordered probit estimations of opinions about inequality and discrimination diagnosis


	More equal distribution* (1)	Equal gender opportunities* (2)	Equal race opportunities* (3)	Female barriers to full-time jobs* (4)
Political ideology	-0.225***	0.063**	0.073**	-0.067**
BS	0.084	-0.140**	-0.211***	0.109*
HS	-0.281***	0.453***	0.417***	-0.240***
Pro-market attitudes	-0.946***	0.466***	0.595***	-0.434***
Female (yes=1; no=0)	-0.236***	-0.185**	0.216**	0.235***
Age	0.006	0.014***	0.001	-0.010**
Academic work (yes=1; no=0)	-0.163*	0.029	0.222**	0.113
Living abroad (yes=1; no=0)	-0.186	0.016	0.093	0.457***
Master degree (yes=1; no=0)	0.281***	-0.061	-0.149	0.164*
Doctorate degree (yes=1; no=0)	0.169	-0.215	-0.258	0.543***
Father: tertiary education (yes=1; no=0)	-0.023	0.042	0.002	0.005
Observations	786	791	776	789

Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Source: Author's estimates based on EEGU

To provide a more meaningful interpretation of the ideological variables' impact, we estimated the predicted value for each statement at all ideological variable values, setting the other covariates at their mean values. We graphically report the predicted agreement probability (responses 4 and 5 on the Likert scale) with each diagnosis statement in Figure 3.

Figure 3. Predicted probability of agreement with diagnosis by values of ideological variables.



Source: Author's estimates based on EEGU

The graph clearly shows the signs of the relationships already depicted. The newly reported information is the magnitude of the effects. They are tiny when moving along the BS index, indicating the low association between benevolent sexism and diagnosis of inequality and discrimination. Conversely, political ideology exhibits the most prominent marginal effects, particularly concerning the gender and racial equal opportunity diagnosis for which the likelihood of agreement changes by more than 90 p.p. when passing from the extreme left to the extreme right. Meanwhile, the HS index changes around 30 p.p. between its extreme values for all diagnoses. Finally, the effect magnitude of preferences for the free market varies between diagnoses. The highest effect, equivalent to 82 p.p. between extremes of the pro-market attitudes index, corresponds to the fairness perception of distribution.

We expect that diagnosis affects policy-related opinions. For example, we may expect economists who perceive no severe problems in an area to reject policy changes. Thus, ideological variables would affect policy-related opinions through their impact on diagnosis views. Eventually, ideological variables would also directly affect opinions on policy. We compare the results of two estimations to analyze the role of indirect and direct channels. First, we estimate equation (2) for each policy statement. Then, we include the diagnostic statements related to the policy statement field (inequality or discrimination diagnosis) as explanatory variables.

Table 5 presents the results concerning policies on inequality. Panel A of the table reports the coefficients of the ideological dimensions obtained by estimating equation (2).⁶ Being further to the right-wing decreases the likelihood of validating the state's redistributive action, favoring inheritance taxes, and considering direct taxes as the core taxes. Besides, it increases the agreement that taxes on the richest should not increase because they already pay very high taxes. A similar response pattern emerges when the support of the market and the HS index rise. In contrast, the BS index displays a different pattern: as it increases, validation of the redistributive action of the state and favoring inheritance taxes also do. Meanwhile, the preference for public spending over taxes as a redistributive tool is not associated with ideological variables.

Panel B of Table 5 reports the results obtained when equation (2) includes the diagnostic statement as a covariate. As expected, those who believe that distribution should be more equitable are more inclined to implement changes in redistributive instruments. This is the case with the support for not increasing taxes on the richest. Besides, individuals who consider income distribution unfair are more likely to endorse the redistributive role of the government, support direct taxes as the core of taxes, and defend inheritance taxes for philosophical reasons.

In sum, the policy-related statements correlate with considering the income distribution inequitable except for the preference of spending over tax instruments. Thus, ideological variables may affect policy preferences through the diagnosis. However, given a diagnosis of equity, the coefficient signs of political ideology, hostile sexism, and pro-market attitudes tend to persist, although some changes are detected. The most noticeable is that political ideology does not affect the support for direct taxes, and HS does not affect the opinion about taxes on top incomes. Additionally, the benevolent sexism index becomes positively significant in two cases.

⁶ Complete estimations are presented in Table A.4 in Annex.

Table 5. Estimated coefficients of the ordered probit estimations of opinions about inequality policies.

	Validity of state redistributive action	Direct taxes as the core of taxes	In favor of inheritance taxes	Spending preferable to taxes	Non-increase of taxes on top incomes
Panel A					
Political ideology	-0.276***	-0.078***	-0.243***	0.014	0.234***
BS	0.178***	0.084	0.175***	-0.006	-0.056
HS	-0.246***	-0.146***	-0.272***	0.063	0.144***
Pro-market attitudes	-0.614***	-0.316***	-0.738***	-0.027	1.249***
Obs.	790	762	772	786	780
Panel B					
More equitable distribution	0.470***	0.176***	0.273***	0.048	-0.349***
Political ideology	-0.223***	-0.049	-0.207***	0.019	0.190***
BS	0.170***	0.066	0.171***	-0.036	-0.036
HS	-0.168***	-0.101**	-0.243***	0.092*	0.077
Pro-market attitudes	-0.360***	-0.249**	-0.586***	-0.019	1.075***
Obs.	785	756	767	780	775

Notes: Besides the reported variables, the estimations include the covariates female, age, academic work, living abroad, master degree, doctorate degree, and father's education.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Source: Author's estimates based on EEGU

We follow the same procedure to analyze policy-related opinions on discrimination and report the findings in Table 6.⁷

Panel A shows that as we move to the right in the political spectrum, economists tend to disfavor the promotion of gender equality in political decision-making, affirmative action policies for gender and race balance, and the development of childcare services. However, the statistical significance of the association is lower for the latter. The same pattern holds for the HS and pro-market attitudes indexes.

The differential nature of benevolent and hostile sexism is again evident in these results. A higher level of BS is associated with supporting the promotion of gender equality in political decision-making and affirmative policies to achieve gender and race balance. However, endorsing benevolent sexist beliefs is not statistically associated with favoring child services development.

Panel B shows the association between diagnostic statements and policies. Diagnosis of gender inequity in opportunities and female barriers to access to full-time jobs increases the support of gender-related policies. However, the precision of implementing policies to ensure the availability and accessibility of childcare services is weak. Regarding the support for

⁷ Complete estimations are presented in Table A.5 in Annex.

affirmative action for race balance, not only does the diagnosis of racial equal opportunities affect it, but also the gender diagnosis. Meanwhile, race-related diagnosis does not affect gender-related policies.

Once again, there is a tendency for ideological variables' effects to persist. However, a remarkable finding is that the impact of political ideology tends to vanish, except in the case of the promotion of gender equity in political decision-making. An explanation may come from the fact that left-wing parties promote gender-related policies in politics.

Table 6. Estimated coefficients of the ordered probit estimations of opinions about discrimination policies.


	Promotion of gender equity in political decision-making	In favor of affirmative policies for gender balance	In favor of childcare services development	In favor of affirmative policies for race balance
Panel A				
Political ideology	-0.109***	-0.063**	-0.070*	-0.071**
BS	0.137**	0.236***	0.104	0.239***
HS	-0.436***	-0.376***	-0.178***	-0.347***
Pro-market attitudes	-0.701***	-0.739***	-0.828***	-0.821***
Obs	789	777	783	773
Panel B				
Gender equity in employment opportunities	-0.474***	-0.388***	-0.090	-0.144***
Race equity in employment opportunities	-0.008	-0.008	-0.023	-0.245***
Female barriers to full-time jobs	0.097**	0.137***	0.216***	0.173***
Political ideology	-0.089***	-0.034	-0.066*	-0.038
BS	0.058	0.167***	0.033	0.177***
HS	-0.292***	-0.241***	-0.099	-0.209***
Pro-market attitudes	-0.570***	-0.666***	-0.711***	-0.680***
Obs.	769	756	761	754

Note: Besides the reported variables, the estimations include the covariates female, age, academic work, living abroad, master degree, doctorate degree, and father's education
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Source: Author's estimates based on EEGU

Figure 4 and Figure 5 show the predicted probability of agreement (responses 4 and 5 on the Likert scale) with policy-related statements about inequality and discrimination, respectively. These probabilities are controlled for ideology, with covariates set at their mean values.

Figure 4. Predicted probability of agreement with policy-related opinions on inequality by ideological variables values.




Source: Author's estimates based on EEGU

For the policy statements related to inequality, most of the curves in the top two graphs are relatively flat, indicating that the magnitude of the effects is small for hostile and benevolent sexism. Hostile sexism shows the largest difference between the lowest and highest levels, seen in opinions on inheritance taxes (36 p.p.). Benevolent sexism exhibits even smaller variations, with the highest differences also seen in opinions on inheritance taxes.

The bottom two graphs clearly illustrate that political ideology and pro-market attitudes cause greater variation in predicted agreement probabilities than sexism. The most prominent effects align with the same policy-related statements noted in the sexism analysis. Differences in agreement between the extreme left and right wings range from 62 to 80 p.p., while for pro-market attitudes, the differences fluctuate between 53 p.p. and 76 p.p. Another noticeable finding is the significant effect of pro-market attitudes index on support for inheritance taxes, which declines by 76 p.p. between the extremes.

Figure 5. Predicted probability of agreement with policy-related opinions on discrimination by ideological variables values.



Source: Author's estimates based on EEGU

For policy statements related to discrimination, the effect of hostile and benevolent sexism is minimal, with mostly flat curves for the majority of statements. Hostile sexism shows again the largest differences in support for affirmative policies for gender equality (31 p.p.) and the promotion of gender equity in political decision-making (31 p.p.). For benevolent sexism, the variations are even milder, with the highest differences corresponding to the gender equality statement (19 p.p.).

The two graphs at the bottom illustrate that political ideology and pro-market attitudes lead to greater variation in predicted agreement probabilities than sexism, similar to the findings for policy-statements related to inequality. The most notable effects are observed in the same policy-related opinions identified in the sexism analysis. A significant observation is the relatively flat curve for the policy related to childcare service development across all ideological variables, except for the pro-market attitudes index, which shows a variation of 24 p.p.

7. Conclusions

Our findings reveal that political ideology, hostile sexism, and pro-market attitudes are significantly associated with Uruguayan's economists' perceptions and policy preferences related to inequality and discrimination. Right-wing political ideology, higher levels of hostile sexism, and stronger pro-market attitudes are associated with a lower likelihood of agreeing that income distribution in Uruguay should be more equitable and that women face barriers to full-time employment. Conversely, these ideological factors increase the likelihood of believing that there are equal gender and race opportunities in the country. Benevolent sexism exhibits a more mixed relationship with opinions on inequality and discrimination, suggesting a fundamentally different nature of the ideologies embedded in benevolent and hostile sexism. We also find that economists' diagnoses of inequality and discrimination mediate the relationship between ideological variables and their policy preferences. However, even when controlling for these diagnoses, the effects of political ideology, hostile sexism, and pro-market attitudes tend to show persistent effects in shaping policy opinions.

The magnitude of the effects is more pronounced for political ideology and pro-market attitudes compared to benevolent and hostile sexism. Even in the case of policies related to gender balance, the ideological profile associated with political factors has more significant effects than the ideological profile associated with hostile or benevolent sexism.

The study highlights the complex interplay between ideology and economists' opinions on inequality and discrimination, calling for a more nuanced understanding of how personal values and beliefs influence economic thought and policy recommendations. As the discipline of economics continues to shape discussions on these issues, it is important for economists to engage in critical reflection and strive for greater awareness of their own biases and assumptions.

We are aware of the limitations of our research regarding the assumption of exogeneity for ideology, sexism, and pro-market attitudes, which may be influenced by socialization or self-selection into the field of economics.

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Appendix

Table A1. Descriptives of dependent variables

Variables	N	Mean	Median
Female (yes=1; no=0)	871	0.476	0
Age	871	37.01	35
Father: tertiary education (yes=1; no=0)	871	0.378	0
Master degree (yes=1; no=0)	871	0.418	0
Doctorate degree (yes=1; no=0)	871	0.0654	0
Academic work (yes=1; no=0)	871	0.493	0
Living abroad (yes=1; no=0)	871	0.116	0
Benevolent sexism	796	2.754	2.667
Hostile sexism	796	2.168	2
Pro-free-market attitudes	871	2.81	2.75
Political ideology	799	4.130	4

Source: Author's estimations based on EEGU

Table A2. Opinions related to the support of the free market and government interventions

Phrasing of opinion	Reverse order
Market solutions are the most efficient way to allocate resources in most circumstances	
Consumer protection laws generally reduce economic efficiency	
The best way to promote economic growth is that the government not to carry out productive activities	
It is desirable to implement temporary selective policies to protect the nascent industry from import competition	X
The government should be more active in controlling greenhouse gas emissions	X
<i>(Support to)</i> Significantly limit the power of unions	
<i>(Support to)</i> Make layoffs more flexible	
<i>(Support to)</i> Impose restrictions on the purchase and sale of foreign currency in the case of a balance of payment crisis	X
<i>(Support to)</i> Establish restrictions on international capital movements	X
<i>(Support to)</i> Promote the use of peer-to-peer loan platforms -also known as fintech or 'financial Uber'-	
Taxing on polluting emissions is better than imposing maximum permissible levels to reduce pollution	
Modify the replacement rates is better than increasing the minimum retirement age to postpone the retirement age	

Table A3. Spearman's correlation (p-value in parenthesis)

	Political Ideology	Pro-market attitudes	Hostile Sexism	Benevolent Sexism
Political Ideology	1			
Pro-market attitudes	0.7089 (0.0000)	1		
Hostile Sexism	0.4661 (0.0000)	0.4398 (0.0000)	1	
Benevolent Sexism	0.0021 (0.9538)	-0.0285 (0.4235)	0.0981 (0.0057)	1

Source: Author's estimations based on EEGU

Table A.4 Estimated coefficients of the ordered probit estimations of opinions about inequality policies (complete estimations).

	Validity of state redistributive action	Direct taxes as the core of taxes	In favor of inheritance taxes	Spending preferable to taxes	More equitable distribution*	Non-increase of taxes on top incomes
Panel A						
Political ideology	-0.276***	-0.078***	-0.243***	0.014	-0.225***	0.234***
BS	0.178***	0.084	0.175***	-0.006	0.084	-0.056
HS	-0.246***	-0.146***	-0.272***	0.063	-0.281***	0.144***
Pro-market attitudes	-0.614***	-0.316***	-0.738***	-0.027	-0.946***	1.249***
Female (yes=1; no=0)						
Age	-0.125	-0.354***	-0.497***	0.052	-0.236***	0.285***
Academic work (yes=1; no=0)	-0.006*	-0.002	-0.012***	0.017***	0.006	0.002
Living abroad (yes=1; no=0)	-0.077	0.134	0.169*	0.051	-0.163*	-0.043
Master degree (yes=1; no=0)	-0.079	-0.121	0.190	-0.187	-0.186	-0.238*
Doctorate degree (yes=1; no=0)	0.184*	0.301***	0.021	-0.124	0.281***	-0.095
Father: tertiary education (yes=1; no=0)	0.434**	0.407**	0.339*	-0.121	0.169	-0.006
	-0.060	0.004	-0.043	0.057	-0.023	0.007
Obs.	790	762	772	786	786	780
Panel B						
More equitable distribution*	0.470***	0.176***	0.273***	0.048		-0.349***
Political ideology	-0.223***	-0.049	-0.207***	0.019		0.190***
BS	0.170**	0.066	0.171***	-0.036		-0.036
HS	-0.168***	-0.101**	-0.243***	0.092*		0.077
Pro-market attitudes						
Female (yes=1; no=0)	-0.360***	-0.249**	-0.586***	-0.019		1.075***
Age	-0.074	-0.342***	-0.473***	0.052		0.245***
Academic work (yes=1; no=0)	-0.010**	-0.003	-0.014***	0.016***		0.004
Living abroad (yes=1; no=0)	-0.010	0.153*	0.191**	0.056		-0.082
Master degree (yes=1; no=0)	-0.054	-0.079	0.173	-0.197		-0.262*
Doctorate degree (yes=1; no=0)	0.123	0.288***	-0.013	-0.141		-0.037
Father: tertiary education (yes=1; no=0)	0.461**	0.354*	0.390**	-0.145		-0.006
	-0.050	-0.003	-0.025	0.069		-0.016
Obs.	785	756	767	780		775

Source: Author's estimations based on EEGU.

Table A.5 Estimated coefficients of the ordered probit estimations of opinions about discrimination policies (complete estimations).

	Gender equity in political decision-making	Gender equity in employment opportunities*	Race equity in employment opportunities*	Female barriers to full-time jobs*	In favor of affirmative policies for gender balance	In favor of childcare services development	In favor of affirmative policies for race balance
Panel A							
Political ideology	-0.109***	0.063**	0.073**	-0.067**	-0.063**	-0.073*	-0.071**
BS	0.137**	-0.140**	-0.211***	0.109*	0.236***	0.104	0.239***
HS	-0.436***	0.453***	0.417***	-0.240***	-0.376***	-0.178***	-0.347***
Pro-market attitudes	-0.701***	0.466***	0.595***	-0.434***	-0.739***	-0.828***	-0.821***
Female	0.313***	-0.185**	0.216**	0.235***	0.445***	0.165	0.244***
Age	-0.015***	0.014***	0.001	-0.010**	-0.007*	-0.005	-0.000
Academic work	-0.051	0.029	0.222**	0.113	-0.151*	-0.294**	-0.194**
Living abroad	0.139	0.016	0.093	0.457***	0.278**	0.346*	0.209
Master degree	0.280***	-0.061	-0.149	0.164*	0.108	0.393***	0.133
Doctorate degree	0.369*	-0.215	-0.258	0.543***	0.162	0.365	0.085
Father: tertiary education	-0.076	0.042	0.002	0.005	-0.258	-0.180	-0.194**
Obs	789	791	776	789	777	783	773
Panel B							
Gender equity in employment opportunities*	-0.474***				-0.388***	-0.090	-0.144***
Race equity in employment opportunities*	-0.008				-0.008	-0.023	-0.245***
Female barriers to full-time jobs*	0.097**				0.137***	0.216***	0.173***
Political ideology	-0.089***				-0.034	-0.063*	-0.038
BS	0.058				0.167***	0.033	0.177***
HS	-0.292***				-0.241***	-0.099	-0.209***
Pro-market attitudes	-0.570***				-0.666***	-0.711***	-0.680***
Female	0.223***				0.339***	0.109	0.239***
Age	-0.012***				-0.003	-0.003	0.003
Academic work	-0.054				-0.178*	-0.303**	-0.205**
Living abroad	0.127				0.354**	0.251	0.303***
Master degree	0.291***				0.106	0.370***	0.099
Doctorate degree	0.291				-0.011	0.294	-0.089
Father: tertiary education	-0.073				-0.267***	-0.138	-0.222**
Obs.	769				756	761	754

Source: Author's estimations based on EEGU.